




Director of
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Intelligence

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


National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

11 April 1979

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SITUATION REPORT

TANZANIA-UGANDA

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//Tanzanian forces began their final assault on central Kampala yesterday, after shelling the city.

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President Amin's whereabouts are unknown, but according to press reports he is somewhere in eastern Uganda.

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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

CHINA-KAMPUCHEA: Political Maneuvering

China's inability to reconcile its two major political and military assets--Prince Sihanouk and Pol Pot--has prevented Beijing from pushing for an international conference on Kampuchea. In the last week, however, tentative signs have appeared that Beijing will take advantage of any change in Kampuchea that might allow a political solution there.

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favorable coverage to statements in the US calling for an international conference. One of the broadcasts implied approval of linking US-Vietnam normalization to a negotiated Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea.

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Beijing has an interest in an eventual political solution in Kampuchea, but it is not clear why the Chinese are now floating--however indirectly--the concept of an international conference. We have no evidence suggesting that China has resolved its Pol Pot dilemma; Pol Pot, as the effective head of in-country anti-Vietnamese forces, may well be instrumental in eventually forcing Hanoi to bargain. On the other hand, Pol Pot, because of his previous brutal policies and unacceptability to Sihanouk and international opinion, remains perhaps the major impediment to an eventual political solution.

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Nevertheless, Beijing may be beginning to position itself to take advantage of any sudden change in the situation in Kampuchea. Sihanouk told Ambassador Woodcock in Beijing Monday that China's more "positive" attitude toward an international conference may be due to the "deterioration" in Pol Pot's battlefield position. Sihanouk added that he was pessimistic about the chances a conference could get underway soon.

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USSR-PAKISTAN: Renewed Pressure

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//Recent Soviet diplomatic and propaganda pressure on Pakistan indicates that Moscow is more concerned about protecting the Afghan regime than in immediately exploiting Pakistan's withdrawal from CENTO and the recently announced US aid cutoff.

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An article signed by A. Petrov in *Pravda* yesterday--the fourth authoritative Soviet commentary on Afghanistan in less than a month--again charged that Pakistan is the "main place d'armes" for anti-Afghan subversive activity. *Pravda* accused Pakistan's armed forces, along with their "US, Chinese, and Egyptian military advisers" of allegedly training some 5,000 saboteurs for operations into Afghanistan and said the "Pakistani authorities" not only tolerate these activities but "obviously connive with them."

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Moscow's warnings are also aimed at any possible third-country involvement in Pakistan against the Afghan regime. Premier Kosygin, during his trip to India last month, reportedly told Prime Minister Desai that Pakistan was aiding the Afghan exile challenge to the government of President Taraki with the assistance of the US. Petrov, in his *Pravda* article, also noted that the US prefers to "remain in the shadows, acting as far as possible through third countries and proxies."

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PAKISTAN-INDIA-US: Reaction to Aid Cutoff

Pakistani officials are increasing their public denunciations of the cutoff of US aid announced on 6 April, but changes in Pakistan's nuclear or foreign policies do not appear imminent. In India, where the US action is widely interpreted as confirmation that Pakistan is developing nuclear weapons, the government's stated policy not to develop a nuclear arsenal seems sure to come under new pressure. [REDACTED]

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Government officials and political leaders in Pakistan are continuing to characterize the US decision as an anti-Islamic move aimed at denying Pakistan and its fellow Muslim states sophisticated nuclear technology. They are terming US policy "discriminatory" for permitting the continued supply of nuclear fuel to India while penalizing Pakistan for pursuing its own "peaceful" nuclear programs. In some circles, the timing of the announcement--just three days after former Prime Minister Bhutto's execution--is also seen as a manifestation of US ire that its pleas for clemency were not heeded. Despite their unhappiness, Pakistani leaders are unlikely to make any significant policy changes until they have assessed the implications of the aid cutoff in the context of the overall US-Pakistani relationship, especially the 1959 defense agreement. [REDACTED]

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The Indian Government, which has not yet made an official statement, is likely to be pressed in Parliament for an official assessment of the implications for its own nuclear programs. [REDACTED]

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ISRAEL-LEBANON: Airstrikes

Israeli aircraft struck two Palestinian maritime installations in southern Lebanon yesterday in apparent retaliation for terrorist incidents in Israel this year. The airstrikes were the first Israeli military response to the Palestinians since a cease-fire in late January ended more than a month of intermittent clashes. The US defense attache in Tel Aviv believes that the Palestinians are likely to respond with renewed actions against Israel, although we have not noted any response thus far.

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CHINA-VIETNAM: Border Provocations

China's official news agency on Monday accused the Vietnamese of continuing armed provocations along the Sino-Vietnamese border. According to the Chinese, Vietnamese soldiers entered Chinese territory on nine occasions between 24 March and 8 April, wounding some Chinese soldiers and civilians and laying mines inside China. The Vietnamese, however, charge that the Chinese are regrouping their forces and have fired on Vietnamese troops and frontier posts.

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ITALY: National Election

Prime Minister Andreotti's government yesterday decided to schedule a national election on 3 and 4 June. Legal technicalities prevented Andreotti from having the contest on 10 June, the same day as the first direct elections to the European Parliament. Holding the Italian vote earlier could reduce the effect of broader European issues on the domestic debate, which is likely to center on the question of direct Communist participation in the government. This situation will probably benefit the Christian Democrats and Communists and will work against the Socialists and some smaller parties, which hoped their expected strong showings in the European election would buoy their vote in the national contest.

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SPECIAL ANALYSES

TURKEY: Population Growth and Socioeconomic Strains

Turkey's current economic troubles, which include a slowdown in economic growth, burgeoning unemployment, and accelerating inflation, are part of a larger complex of long-term socioeconomic problems associated with the nation's drive for modernization. These problems are producing social tensions that will subject Turkey's democratic institutions to a severe test in the next few years. A basic ingredient in these problems is the relentless growth of the population.

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The population, estimated at 43.7 million, is growing at a rate of 2.5 percent, or more than a million people a year. This rate, typical of other middle-income countries, compares with less than 1 percent for most developed countries. Turkey's high rate of growth is unlikely to change substantially in the next decade; 40 percent of the population is now under 15 years of age. By 1990, the population probably will have increased by a third and will exceed 57 million. The government has shown little inclination to take a vigorous role in trying to limit population growth, and the political sensitivity of the issue reduces the prospects for effective family planning policies.

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Turkey's society is in a transitional stage--it now is at a middle level of economic development. Growing industrialization, rapid urbanization, migration of workers abroad, and a rising level of education have contributed to changes in social values and to demands for a better life. Rapid population growth is placing a strain on the country's resources. Probably less than a third of the secondary-school-age children, for example, have schools available to them.

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Unemployment

Despite impressive growth in the past 30 years, the economy has failed to provide enough jobs for the growing labor force. The official unemployment rate, which

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understates the problem, has been more than 10 percent throughout the 1970s, and the outlook is for a long-term trend of rising unemployment. The current rate approaches 20 percent. [REDACTED]

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A strong demand for migrants to work in Western Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s provided an escape valve for a time, but migration abroad peaked in 1973 and is unlikely to provide much relief in the foreseeable future, despite new opportunities for some migrants in oil producing Middle Eastern countries. Many migrants have now returned to Turkey from Europe; if economic conditions in Western Europe weaken further, returning migrants will add substantially to the problem. [REDACTED]

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Urbanization

Urban growth has been rapid--as much as 6 percent a year in the largest cities--further intensifying the unemployment problem. The percentage of the population living in cities increased from less than 20 percent in 1950 to more than 40 percent by 1975. During that time the population of Ankara mushroomed from less than 300,000 to 1.7 million, and Istanbul went from less than 1 million to more than 2.5 million. The population of metropolitan Istanbul is now about 4.5 million. Growth has severely strained urban infrastructure and services and has caused a sharp deterioration in the urban environment. Water has periodically been in short supply in the cities for some years. [REDACTED]

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The migration from rural to urban areas has created an explosive force in the cities by bringing together members of different sectarian or ethnic groups with longstanding mutual animosities and distrust. They must compete for jobs in a deteriorating employment market. Violence, some of it politically inspired, has become common in the crowded cities and suburbs, where left-right conflict is superimposed on traditional group hostilities. [REDACTED]

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Other Socioeconomic Pressures

Heightened social tensions also stem from growing dissatisfaction with the traditional urban elite, which dominates the highly centralized government bureaucracy.

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The urban middle class includes entrepreneurs of considerable wealth and a privileged group of organized skilled laborers; all are zealous in guarding their interests. Agrarian, religious, and ethnic minority groups have challenged the influence of the elite. Cooptation often occurs but tends to make the elite more diverse and makes consensus more difficult. Student unrest--reflected in increasing outbreaks of violence--is fueled by dissatisfaction with the inadequate educational system and with bleak employment prospects. [REDACTED]

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All groups are likely to feel the effects of economic stress in the next few years. Current economic problems stem to a large extent from a development strategy emphasizing capital-intensive import-substitution industrialization. This strategy has not made the most efficient use of Turkey's abundant labor supply or other resources. Economic growth has failed to eliminate wide economic disparities among regions and between the cities and rural areas. Agriculture has been relatively neglected. Balanced and sustained development will require a major shift in the orientation of government policies. [REDACTED]

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JAMAICA-USSR: Manley in Moscow

[REDACTED]

//Prime Minister Manley's five-day visit to the USSR this week will add fuel to the bitter controversy in Jamaica over his growing links with local and foreign Communists. Despite Manley's high hopes for his official visit, which began Monday, it will probably result at most in modest agreements for reciprocal trade and economic cooperation. The trip may boost the Prime Minister's stock among local radicals, but at the cost of further strain in his relations with Jamaica's moderates, especially in the crucial private sector.// [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

The Prime Minister has publicly described the trip as part of his long-standing goal to diversify Jamaica's economic relations. Privately, he is reported to have expressed the view that Soviet aid does not carry the stringent conditions imposed by Western donors. His public assurances, however, have only intensified the growing opposition and hostility of moderate groups critical of the government's improving relations with the USSR. [REDACTED]

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To the Prime Minister's critics, Manley's pro-Soviet line is evident in his speeches to leftist groups, in the propaganda of government-owned media, and in Jamaica's voting record in the UN. The increasingly effective opposition party, the private sector, the independent press, and some church leaders have accused Manley of consciously leading Jamaica toward the "Soviet-Cuban brand" of Communism and have denounced his close collaboration with the island's Communist Party. [REDACTED]

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Soviet-Jamaican Relations

The charges of Manley's critics tend to be overdrawn. They exaggerate the Prime Minister's ability to

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influence events in Jamaica, where democratic institutions are still strong. In fact, local political and economic trends now point to the Prime Minister's probable defeat in the election he must call by 1981. The centrist opposition party led successful antigovernment demonstrations in January, and Manley apparently expects more popular protest in the near future. The underlying concern of his opponents is that Manley--with help from the Soviets, Cubans, and local radicals--will try to rig the election or attempt an unconstitutional seizure of power. [REDACTED]

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Prospects

The bilateral talks in the Kremlin will have little impact on the Jamaican electorate. The small amount of

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aid the Soviets have offered to date--less than \$50 million worth--would if implemented help Manley's position only with the Jamaican left, which is becoming his strongest domestic constituency. [REDACTED]

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//The Prime Minister's working-class power base seems likely to continue to erode because of devaluations, sharply rising food prices, chronic shortages, widening labor unrest, and growing unemployment that now affects more than 30 percent of the labor force. Overall, Manley seems willing to risk a continued deterioration of his relations with the private sector--which is now crucial to economic recovery--for the political security he apparently thinks he can get from local radicals, Cuba, [REDACTED]

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